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1. The nature of the fit between predictions generat-
ed by a theory and the phenomena within its domain can 
sometimes be assessed only when different sources of 
explanation can be isolated through one or more ideal-
izations. One such idealization is the simplifying 
assumption, for the laws of Newtonian mechanics, that 
the physical bodies whose movements fall within their 
scope are (or can be treated as) dimensionless parti-
cles, not subject to distortion or friction. The em-
pirical laws of elasticity and friction are themselves 
best formulated against this background idealization. 
The most frequently discussed idealization in lin-
guistics in recent years has been that of the ideal 
speaker/hearer in a homogeneous speech community (Chomsky 
1965, p.3f). By means of this idealization, through 
which we have learned a distinction between comp~tence 
and performance, we are in principle able to separate 
out of the heterogeneous and disorderly data of speech. (i) the systematic knowledge native speakers 
have about their grammars, 
(ii) variation in the details of such linguis-
tic systems from person to person, and 
(iii) the effects on speech of fluctuations in 
speakers' attentiveness to their own texts, memory 
breakdowns in the course of a text's planning, 
any of the various kinds of speech defects, and 
interruptions from the surrounding world. 
I am going to suggest that there is a second ideal-
ization operating in linguistics, one which underlies 
most traditions of semantics, and which I think it 
would be well to bring out into the open for careful 
discussion. This second idealization involves what I 
shall call the innocent speaker/hearer. In the way 
that, under the familiar idealization, the general 
theory of linguistic competence can be thought of as 
more or less equivalent to a theory of language perform-
ance on the part of an ideal speaker/hearer, we might 
say of certain theories of semantics that they are 
theories of the language-understanding abilities of 
the innocent speaker/hearer. 
I characterize the innocent language user as fol-
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lows. It knows the morphemes of its language and their 
meanings, it recognizes the grammatical structures and 
processes in which these morphemes take part, and it 
knows the semantic import of each of these. As a de-
coder, or hearer, the innocent language user calculates 
the meaning of each sentence from what it knows about 
the sentence's parts and their organization. It makes 
no use of past calculations: each time a structure 
or sentence reappears, it is calculated anew. As an 
encoder, or speaker, the innocent language user decides 
what it wishes its interlocutors to do or feel or be-
lieve and constructs a message which expresses that de-
cision as directly as possible. There are no layers 
of inference between what it says and what it means. 
The innocent speaker/hearer is in principle capable 
of saying anything sayable, given enough time. That is, 
its semantic system satisfies Jerrold Katz's condition 
of Effability and hence qualifies as a full-fledged 
natural language system (Katz 1972, pp.18ff). But the 
discourse of innocents tends to be slow, boring, and 
pedantic. 
One early statement of our idealization is in Bloom-
field's discussion of sememes and episememes. The small-
est meaningful units of lexical form are morphemes, 
and their meanings, we learn, are sememes; the smallest 
meaningful units of gramnatical form are tagmemes, and 
their meanings are episememes. Formally any utterance 
can be described as a collection of lexical and gramnat-
ical forms; semantically any utterance can bl described 
as an assembly of its sememes and episememes (Bloom-
field 1933, pp. 166ff). 
In more recent work the semantic capabilities of an 
innocent speaker/hearer have come to be spoken of in 
terms of compositionality, a term first used, I think, 
in Katz and Fodor 1 s 1963 paper on the structure of a 
semantic theory (Katz and Fodor 1963, p.171). More re-
cently still John Searle has equated the idea of a com-
positional semantics with an assumption about the determ-
ination of a sentence's "literal meaning." In his form-
ulation of that assumption "(T)he literal meaning of 
a sentence is entirely determined by the meanings of 
its component words (or morphemes) and the syntactical 
rules according to which these elements are combined" 
(Searle 1978, p. 207). 
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The model of semantic competence which fits this 
idealization is one which contains a lexicon, a way of 
characterizing grannnatical structures, and a set of 
semantic integration rules. The model is not embarrass-
ed by ambiguity, synonymy, homonymy or vagueness. A 
necessary characteristic of the model is that the mean-
ing of a sentence in a given context is a selection 
from a set of meanings which the sentence has out of 
context. Any semantic theory which treats the determ-
ination of sentence meaning in context by a meaning-
constructing rather than a meaning-selecting process 
goes beyond the powers of the innocence model. 
2. An innocent speaker/hearer can do all of the things 
I said it can do, but it has several important limita-
tions: 
(1) It does not know lexical idioms, that is, 
lexical forms whose meanings could not be determined 
by somebody who knew merely their morphological struc-
ture and the meanings of their constituent morphemes. 
Knowing JAIL and PRISON and all possible uses of the 
-ER suffix could not enable an innocent to figure out 
the difference in meaning between JAILER and PRISONER. 2 (2) The innocent language user does not know 
phrasal idioms. If you were to go up to it and say, 
YOUR GOOSE IS COOKED:, it would feel worried if it 
had a pet goose, grateful if it had just brought a 
goose carcass home for dinner, or puzzled if it had 
no goose at all. But it would lack the idiomatic in-
terpretation that the rest of us are able to give the 
expression. 
(3) The innocent language user does not know lex-
ical collocations that are not based on necessary mean-
ing relations. If it knows the expression BLITHERING 
IDIOT at all, it has to assume that BLITHERING is a form 
of the verb BLITHER and that it can be used of anything 
that 'blithers.' Understanding only the meanings of 
the words, it has no reason to know that BLITHERIN1 is 
limited to the context in which it modifies IDIOT. (4) It lacks the ability to judge the appropriate-
ness of fixed expressions to specific types of situations. 
It has no situational associations with such expressions 
as THIS HURTS ME MORE THAN IT HURTS YOU or THIS IS WHERE 
I CAME IN, to say nothing of such semantically opaque 
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locutions as KNOCK ON WOOD or SPEAK OF THE DEVIL. 
(5) It possesses no construal principles for meta-
phorical language use, nor, in fact, does it have any 
reason to believe that language can be used metaphor-
ically. It is accordingly ignorant of the conventional 
images that provide grounding for metaphoric interpre-
tation in its language. Suppose we induced it to try 
to interpret the metaphoric utterance, I'LL STAND BEHIND 
YOU. It has no basis for preferring the image of a per-
son falling backwards, an image which would allow the 
utterance to be taken as comforting, over that of a 
person falling forwards, in wh!ch case the expression 
could be taken as threatening. 
(6) In general the innocent language user lacks 
any interpretive mechanisms for indirect communication, 
that is, for meaning one thing while saying another, 
or principles of text coherence that would allow it 
to 'read between the lines' in a text. If we can sup-
pose that it enjoys being flattered, then it will in-
deed be flattered if we say to it, YOU HAVE A VERY 
LOVELY LEFT EYE.5 
(7) The innocent one has no background of under-
standing for what might be called text structure. That 
is, it is unable to 'situate' pieces of text within 
slots defined for given kinds of texts. One of the 
clearest examples of the kind of 'situating' I have in 
mind is provided by a convention in Japanese letter-
writing. Personal letters in Japan are expected to be-
gin with a preamble which contains comments on the cur-
rent season. The innocent, on reading at the beginning 
of a letter that its Japanese correspondent's garden 
floor is covered with leaves will not realize ghat 
this remark serves to satisfy that convention. 
Summarizing, the innocent speaker/hearer does not 
know about lexical idioms, phrasal idioms, lexical col-
locations, situational formulas, indirect communica-
tion, or the expected structures of texts of given 
types. The collections of things the innocent language 
user does not know gives us a catalogue of the kinds 
of uses of and responses to language that fall outside 
of the ideal of a pure compositional semantics. The 
innocence idealization is in fact frequently thought 
of as establishing the boundary between semantics proper 
and such neighboring concerns as pragmatics, rhetoric, 
logic, and language comprehension. I will be showing 
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below that in this purest form the idealization has 
proved to be incompatible with the territorial urges 
of some semantic theorists. 
3. But first I need to introduce some new distinctions. 
The semantics of innocence is a compositional semantics, 
but I need to say more now about just what that means. 
I would like to begin by reviewing a distinction that 
is sometimes ignored, that between compositionality 
proper and motivation. An expression can be spoken 
of as motivated if the speakers of the language see 
it as having the form it has by virtue of some (possibly 
vaguely perceived) word-forming or phrase-forming prin-
ciples. POET, POEM and POETRY appear to be constructed 
out of 'partly identical material in a way that reflects 
their semantic conunonality, and such words as JAILER 
and PRISONER have components that speakers see as re-
lated to their meanings. On the other hand, when we 
say that an expression's interpretation is composition-
al, we mean that the expression is more than merely 
'motivated'; but what is that additional element? 
To be clear about they we need to make another 
distinction. Here, as in many areas of linguistics, 
I think it is :important to distinguish the decoding, 
or hearer's point of view from the encoding, or speak-
er's point of view. Applying these two perspectives 
in the case of compositionality, we can talk about 
semantic transparency in the decoding case, and seman-
tic productivity in the encoding case. An expression 
is semantically transparent if we can rely on composi-
tional semantics to figure out what it means once we 
encounter it. A set of syntactic-semantic rules is 
semantically productive if by relying on them we can 
succeed in producing fully natural ways of saying what 
we mean. The distinction I am making between the two 
'directions' of compositionality bears on the distinc-
tion between two senses of the English adjective IDIO-
MATIC. In the one case, were I to say that your speech 
is 'idiomatic' I would mean that it contains expressions 
which the innocent language user could not interpret. 
In the other case, in describing your speech as idio-
matic, what I would mean is that it is what an accom-
plished native speaker would naturally say, and that 
means that it is not likely to be what an innocent 
would have chosen to say. The distinction I have just 
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drawn is essentially the distinction between what Adam 
Makkai calls idioms of decoding and idioms of encoding 
(Makkai 1972). 
4. The problems linguists have in dealing with the 
innocence idealization have been in connection with 
fixed expressions, collocations, idioms, indirect com-
munication, and the differences I have just been dis-
cussing regarding motivation and compositionality. 
Many theoretical moves that semanticists have made 
seem to be directed toward increasing the domain of 
semantics while preserving innocence. The goal is 
to reformulate semantic observations in such a way 
that the innocence idealization fits cases it didn't 
fit before the reformulation, thus reducing the need 
to look for new sources of explanation. Compositional 
semantics, after all, is dependable and formally easy 
to cope with: the more that can be brought into its 
scope the better off we are. Or so it is sometimes 
thought. 
(1) One of the innocence-preserving moves that 
I have in mind involves the context restriction of the 
senses of a polysemous word. What may have looked 
like a lexical or phrasal idiom will turn out to fit 
a purely compositional semantics if we allow ourselves 
to say that some of the morphemes have senses that just 
happen to be limited to this specific context. Zellig 
Harris has a beautiful formulation of this principle, 
using BLUEBERRY as his key example. He states, "the 
meaning of an element in each linguistic environment 
is the difference between the meaning of its linguistic 
environment and the meaning of the whole utterance (i.e. 
the whole social situation). Thus the meaning of blue 
in blueberry might be said to be the meaning of blue-
berry minus the meaning of berry and of the '---:-::---
morpheme: blue here therefore does not mean simply a 
color, but the observable differentia of blueberries 
as against other berries." (Harris 1951, p. 347). 
Instead of saying that the word BLUEBERRY is a composite 
word which somebody in the history of the English-speak-
ing people invented as a name for a particular genus 
of berries, .a formulation which departs from innocence, 
we can now be pleased to realize that the word contains 
exactly the right morphemes and that these together, 
by completely regular rules, designate exactly this genus 
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of berries. 
(2) The Hungarian semanticist Laszlo Antal pre-
serves innocence in a far different way: he does so 
by insisting on a sharp distinction between meaning 
and content. To Antal, every morpheme has a unique mean-
ing, and every expression composed of morphemes has a 
meaning exactly represented by that assembly of morph-
emes. Content, by contrast, appears only with sentences 
and texts, not with words, and can be described only 
by using knowledge of facts that are clearly outside of 
linguistics. Meaning and content, Antal says, "differ 
from each other in that the former is broken down into 
smaller parts, while content manifests itself as an 
undivided whole. This, he goes on, "is because the 
meaning of the sentence is made up of the meanings of 
the individual morphemes that occur in it." Antal 
would say that the meaning differences separating PETER 
LOST HIS WAY, PETER LOST HIS MIND, PETER LOST HIS JOB 
and PETER. LOST HIS PATIENCE are to be found precisely 
and unambiguously in the meaning differences separating 
WAY, MIND, PATIENCE and JOB.7 Their differences in 
content are not so orderly; but that, according to Antal, 
is not the semanticist's concern (Antal 1964, p.23). 
(3) A third move for preserving innocence is that 
taken by Charles Hockett; it is a decision by which 
expressions which might appear to some people to be 
morphologically complex and semantically irregular turn 
out to be primary linguistic units and hence to offer 
no challenge to compositional semantics. One way of 
accomplishing this kind of redefinitional solution 
would be to extend the range of the term morpheme to 
include lexical and phrasal idioms. At the lexical 
level this would be to say that such words as REFER, 
PREFER, RECEDE and PRECEDE are synchronically four sep-
arate undivided morphemes whose internal structures 
have only etymological relevance. Hackett's choice, 
by contrast, was to generalize the term idiom to make 
it include morphemes. If an idiom is a linguistic form 
whose meaning is not built up out of the meanings of 
its constituent parts, then morphemes are idioms. Hav-
ing made this terminological choice, Hockett can then 
claim that "any utterance consists wholly of an integral 
number of idioms. Any composite form which is not it-
self idiomatic consists of smaller forms which are." 
(Hockett 1958, p.173). We are left, then, with a uni-
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form class of primary meaning-bearing elements, and no 
troublesome distinction between morphemes and idioms. 
This decision appears to leave us with the problem 
of not being able to recognize that certain expressions 
are simultaneously fixed expressions and semantically 
motivated. One possible solution--I don't know whether 
this would be Hockett's solution--is to regard what I 
see as a descriptive problem as simply involving the 
distinction between a pure synchronic description of 
a language on the one hand and on the other hand what-
ever knowledge or beliefs speakers may have of the 
motivational basis of given linguistic forms at the 
time they were introduced into the language. 
(4) A fourth conunon move to preserve innocence 
is one which claims a sharp distinction between knowl-
edge about shared meanings and knowledge about the world. 
By distinguishing, as it is sometimes put, a dictionary 
and an encyclopedia, we can allow ourselves to say that 
the innocent speaker/hearer can know everything about 
the meaning of a sentence independently of knowing anything 
at all about what the world is like. 
The relevance of such a decision to the question 
of innocence is that it allows a distinction between 
two kinds of judgments about the acceptability of 
sentences, the one having to do with true semantic 
compatibility and the other with truth or plausibility. 
The semantic integration principles operate by accept-
ing well-formed semantic complexes and rejecting ill-
formed ones. This task is a more cleanly determined 
one if the meaning vs. world distinction is maintained. 
The analyst is left facing a number of decisions, how-
ever, that are extremely hard to make: to borrow a 
favorite example of John Searle's, we might wonder what 
could possibly be the difference between a description 
of an oscilloscope and a statement of the meaning of 
the noun OSCILLOSCOPE. 8 
""(5) A fifth move to preserve innocence is that of 
minimizing the appearance of polysemy in semantic descrip-
tion and formulating invariant meanings for all uses of 
a morpheme or word. Rather than describing the phrase 
CUT THE CARDS, in the sense of dividing and restacking 
a deck of playing cards, as an idiom, we could simply 
try to formulate the meaning of the verb CUT in such a 
way that it included all of the uncontested uses of the 
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verb plus the use we see in this expression. 
A commitment to the formulation of invariant or 
'core' meanings, a position associated in general with 
Dwight Bolinger (Bolinger 1977) and with respect to gram-
matical morphemes in the work of Roman Jakobson (Jakob-
son 1936) and William Diver (Diver 1964), puts its 
holders into an essentially unassailable position. My 
argument against it is that when you have captured the 
core meanings of everything, you have no basis for know-
ing which combinations of words have which meanings. 
The core-meaning linguist insists that morphemes have just the meanings that they have, and that people who 
see a problem in constructing composite meanings out 
of component meanings are confused about the differ-
ence between meaning and comprehension. (6) One final innocence-preserving strategy is the 
one which posits a finite number of possible relations 
that can link together the elements that make up a com-
pound word.9 Given this decision, we can say that the 
noun compounds HORSE SHOES and ALLIGATOR SHOES, to use 
examples from Katz and Fodor (1963), are each ambiguous 
in many ways, and in the same ways. Each can designate 
shoes that are worn by the animal named, that are made 
out of that animal's skin, that are made in the shape 
of the animal, and so on. The fact that each of these 
has been lexicalized in English, conventionalized as 
a composite name with a specific assigned sense, can 
be taken as proper to the study of language use rather 
than semantics; and the fact that in detail the kinds of 
relationships we sense linking the parts of compounds 
do not appear to be neatly classifiable is merely to 
be taken as evidence for the abstractness of the under-
lying relationships (cf. Bolinger 1965, p.568). 
5. The innocence idealization has served linguistics 
well, at least as a heuristic for making linguists aware 
of the various modes of signifying; and in one form or 
another it is a necessary core of any theory capable 
of coping with the reality that speakers and hearers 
do indeed create and comprehend novel sentences. But 
I feel that the desire to generalize it has backed seman-
ticists into analytical corners that they would have done 
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well to stay out of. In particular, I believe that the 
facts which lie outside of anything the innocence model 
is capable of handling are so pervasive and powerful 
that nothing really important is gained by distorting 
the idealization in the way the innocence-preservers 
have chosen to do. I am not arguing that the idealiza-
tion be abandoned; only that it should be kept pure. 
There are three characteristics of the semantic 
systems of real speakers and hearers that seem absolute-
ly critical in this connection. 
The first of these is what might be referred to 
as the 'layering' of conventionality in language. With 
Jerry Morgan we can say that while we need to recognize 
from the start the conventional or arbitrary nature of 
the relations between elementary signs and their mean-
ings, we must also recognize conventional pairings of 
contexts with meanings-to-convey-in-those-contexts, 
as well as conventional pairings between contexts and 
particular expressions by which conventionalized mean-
ings get conveyed in those contexts (Morgan 1978). 
A second characteristic is the inescapable partici-
pation of context and background in constructing the 
meanings of utterances in actual use. PamelaDowning 
(Downing 1977), Herbert and Eve Clark (Clark and Clark 
1978) and Geoffrey Nunberg (Nunberg 1977) have all given 
us an awareness of classes of expressions-in-use which 
have the following properties: they are not semantic-
ally transparent, they do not have conventionally as-
signed meanings, and they cannot be seen as instances 
of metaphoring acts of the usual kind; they are ex-
pressions for whose interpretation we re~uire a de-
tailed understanding of the participants shared engage-
ment in an experiential context. Once the operation of 
context is made clear in these obvious cases, it be-
comes possible for us to ask what role it plays in cases 
that used to appear to satisfy the idealization. I 
suspect that we will sometimes be surprised. 
A third important characteristic of real language 
use is found in what I shall call structural formulas. 
A language's free phrases are limited only by the gram-
mar and what people choose to say; fixed expressions 
have most of their lexical and grammatical, and maybe 
even their prosodic, properties fixed by convention. 
For the structural formulas that I have in mind, the 
grammatical form and possibly one or two lexical items 
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are fixed, but the class of substitutions is open but 
constrained by semantic and pragmatic considerations. 
As an example, consider expressions of the form 'Some-
one plays Something to Someone's Something', as in 
SHE PLAYED DESDEMONA TO MY OTHELLO, which I could use 
in reporting shared theatrical experiences she and I 
have had. As a second example, consider 'X in and X 
out' where X can be a word designating a cyclic calen-
dric term, as in DAY IN AND DAY OUT, YEAR IN AND YFAR 
OUT, etc. (cf. Kiparsky 1976). Or consider the col-
loquial formula 'WATCH Something Happen', a very flex-
ible construction beginning with 'imperative' WATCH and 
followed by an infinitive clause indicating a surprise 
which fate might have in store. (Examples: I've been 
insisting that you're too young to carry such a big 
tray of fruit, and I take it away from you. Then I 
say, NOW WATCH ME DROP IT. We've been planning on a 
picnic for many days, and have just invested a lot of 
money in getting the supplies for it; I say, NOW WATCH 
IT RAIN.)IO 
I expect that there are lots of structural formulas 
like this, each with its own private semantic interpre-
tation rules. If the number and frequency of such con-
structions is very great, there might some day be seman-
ticists who feel that the standard form of compositional 
semantics can be undermined altogether, by having its 
principles absorbed into the list of pairings of such 
formulas and specific semantic interpretation rules. 
It is conceivable that the central principle of truth-
conditional semantics could be introduced, in such a 
system, as an interpretation rule for a structural form-
ula called 'indicative sentence.' 
The argument that this last proposal is not alto-
gether absurd must be saved for another occasion. For 
now let me just hope to have convinced you of the im-
portance of distinguishing real innocence from pretended 
innocence. 
Footnotes 
1. Bloomfield insists, I should point out, that any 
effort to characterize the sememes and episememes sub-
stantively belongs outside of linguistics proper. He 
seems to be saying that if we knew what these things 
were, we would know, as linguists, what to do with them. 
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2. My phrase "the -ER suffix" represents an implicit 
synchronic judgment about the structure of these words. 
The etymologically sophisticated will find the JAILER/ 
PRISONER examples unfair. The claim, however, is 
simply that ordinary speakers will see these words as 
made up of stem plus -ER. 
3. There is a problem, of course, in deciding what 
it is t.o "know the meaning of" a word that has such 
tight collocational requirements, especially since the 
expression is almost never used in what might be called 
its "literal" meaning. Until just a few days ago, I 
myself believed that BLITHERING meant 'drooling.' 
4. This example is borrowed from George Lakoff. 
5. It does not know Oswald Ducrot's 'loi d'exhaustivite' 
(Ducrot 1972, p. 170) or Paul Grice's 'Quantity maxim' 
(Grice 1975, pp. 45ff). 
6. Nor is the innocent in a position to appreciate 
the following facts: (i) that urgent letters in which 
the seasonal remarks are left out usually begin with an 
apology, one version of which is the word ZENRYAKU, an 
abbreviation of a larger expression which means 'apology 
for omitting the preamble'; and (ii) that the Kenkyusha 
Japanese-English dictionary defines ZENRYAKU as "I 
has ten to inform you that • • • " 
7. Antal's examples include only PATIENCE and JOB, 
not the other two. It is clear from the context, how-
ever, that he would accept the statement I made about 
the four sentences. 
8. There is no doubt that for a great many cases such 
a distinction is necessary, but there is clearly a prob-
lem of knowing where to draw the line. For a typical 
statement, see Leech (1974, pp. 87ff). 
9. For a treatment exemplifying this approach as applied 
to the special class of "complex nominals," see Levi (1978). 
10. These expressions cannot be thought of merely as 
~ of imperative sentences with the normal embedding 
verb WATCH, since some of these expressions contain 
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clausal elements that could not normally serve as 
complements of WATCH. I once heard an adolescent girl, 
who had been fretting at some length about how unim-
pressive her blind date was probably going to be, say 
NOW WATCH HIM BE REAL HANDSOME. 
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